The election of conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel earlier this year has brought the promise of a new warmth in U.S.- German relations, but Ischinger won't be in Washington to savor it. In an interview with United Press International a few days before his departure for his new post as German ambassador in London Ischinger talked about the changing nature of of a historic relationship.

Q: What was it like, being the ambassador of the second most vilified country, France being the first, of course?

A: The lowest point for me was the period between late January and early May 2003, in other words the time immediately preceding and during the actual military operation, because that obviously was when it became most strikingly visible that something was going on here where Germany and the U.S. had parted ways, both in the United Nations and, more importantly on the battlefield. I tried to put the friendly face on it, but some of the journalists -- not really the public at large, but certainly the journalists -- gave me a really tough time. I don't blame them, but that was really the low point, obviously.

Then,I quite honestly think that Secretary Rumsfeld made a mistake by actually -- I should use a better word than insulting -- let's say not speaking correctly about Germany. You remember, he compared Germany's attitude to the Iraq war with that of Libya. That sort of thing. I thought that at some point after the row had blown over, he should have in some way said to someone on the German side: Look, this thing about Libya -- I didn't mean it -- but to my knowledge he never did so.

Q: To what extent was the embassy -- were you -- able to operate during that period?

A: Nothing bad ever happened to me, and no one said to me I'm not going to see you -- I had regular sessions with people including with (Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul) Wolfowotz, and I even took Angela Merkel to meet with Rumsfeld when she came in June 2003. As an embassy our treatment by the U.S. government in general was actually very good -- well, let's say appropriate, correct -- but the old cordiality had gone, and you felt it.

Q: Given that the United States and Germany were on a collision course over Iraq, could the situation have played out differently?

A: It's a case book study of how in diplomacy even when governments appear to be talking to one another, it's possible that they don't understand what they are trying to say to one another, which is exactly what happened in 2003. The German government thought things had been said and agreed, and the American side thought that things had been said and agreed, but their understanding was totally different.

There was a massive misunderstanding which led on both sides to a degree of frustration, and bitterness and disappointment, which I think with better, more intensive communication could probably have been avoided. Maybe not totally, but most of the disappointment I think could have been avoided. Now, I believe the dispute is behind us. I don't see any bitterness on the German side, and I don't sense any at the White House, or in other quarters. Maybe there are still some people in the military or the Pentagon that still don't feel comfortable about the fact that we were not doing this together, I won't exclude that.

Q: Was this dispute another symptom of the posst-Cold War era -- another sign that the old allies have drifted apart?

A: There's a difference between say, 1982-85 and 2004-06. In the 1980s up to and including most of the 1990s we still had the famous Quad. The Americans, the Germans, the Brits and the French met at foreign minister level rather regularly, several times a year, sometimes more often, pretending to discuss the issue of Berlin, which was the reason why the group was created in the first place. The Quad provided an informal framework that helped to avoid these types of things.

Q: What happened to the Quad?

A: It was lost in the Clinton years because somehow people seemed to think that the unipolar moment had arrived and none of that was necessary any more. We didn't have these small groups for most of the first Bush term, but more recently -- in 2005 -- we've essentially recreated the Quad in the EU3 discussions with the United States over Iran: it's essentially the same group, and I think that's helpful because it creates an atmosphere of exchange and mutual trust that's essential for avoiding trans-Atlantic misunderstandings. So we're beginning to be back at the level of trans-Atlantic intensity of discussion that we used to have in the old days, in the Cold War and to a certain extent

Q: But is there a forum for wider dialogue between the United States and the Europeans? I assumne it can't be the European Union, but NATO?

A: The German government wishes that NATO will be again the place where the transatlantic community can not only discuss security issues and challenges but will also wish to make decisions -- joint decisions -- about these challenges. Germany wants to take all of our major security decisions within NATO.

There is an enormous expectation and a hope that, as we try to make sure that NATO remains relevant and important, the United States will agree to make the alliance a forum not only for discussion of things that have already been decided in Washington, but also of things that we want to decide together. That would then guarantee NATO's continued relevance.

Q: As you look at geopolitical developments over -- say -- the next ten years, what is likely to keep you awake at night?

A: One: In terms of our own (European) economic competitiveness and survival it will be very important to deal with the challenges of the emerging new economic giants, let's take India and China, but there are others. Can we continue to be prosperous if China produces 50 times more engineers per academic year than Germany, and they all are well trained?

How do we make sure that we still have a little edge, and our products will continue to be sought after by the rest of the world? Most of our own wealth is based on exports. Second is the slightly undefinable risk that Europe and the West and the United States are facing in the greater Middle East, with the unsettled issues of radical extremism, of peace and civility in the greater Middle East, the Palestinian issue, the Iraq issue, the Iran issue, nuclear proliferation, Hamas.

It does not seem likely that these issues will go away in the next ten years. I think that's an even more complex challenge than making sure that we continue to draw Russia into Western fold, for example. The Middle Eastern issues will define the fate of Europe -- and this is why we are all so anxious about Iran. Imagine, if there is a Shiite nuclear bomb, or a development that can lead to that, how long will it take before there will be a Sunni nuclear bomb?

All of a sudden there's reason for many Europeans to believe that maybe we don't live on this isolated island far away from terrorists and terrorism is a theoretical risk and hasn't really hit us at home. I think these things are now raising real questions, and we hope that our governments will make sure that we don't get into a clash of civilizations, that we can manage to avoid one: but it's by no means clear how that will be done.

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